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Introduction
Unlike the Constitutions of other African countries such as Uganda, 1 South Africa, 2 Kenya, 3 Mauritius, 4 Zimbabwe 5 and Namibia 6 which expressly provide for grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against, the Constitution of Seychelles, although prohibits discrimination, does not provide for grounds on which a person may not be discriminate against. Article 27 of the Constitution of Seychelles provides for the right to equal protection of the law in the following terms:
Every person has a right to equal protection of the law including the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set out in this Charter without discrimination on any ground except as is necessary in a democratic society.
2.
Clause (1) shall not preclude any law, programme or activity which has as its object the amelioration of the conditions of disadvantaged persons or groups.
Twomey has argued that Article 27(1) provides for 'the right to be free from all forms of discrimination'. 7 In the preamble to the Constitution of Seychelles, the people of Seychelles reaffirm that the rights provided in the Constitution 'include the rights of the Banking Corporation Ltd v. The Central Bank of Seychelles, 20 the Supreme Court observed that 'Article 27 provides for the right to the equal protection of the law, that is, that all laws are applied equally to all people without discrimination'. 21 This interpretation equates 'equality before the law' with 'equal protection of the law' and consequently blurs the distinction between the two as drawn by the Constitutional Court above.
As mentioned above, the Constitution of Seychelles, unlike those of other African countries, is silent on the grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against. This could explain why some applicants have not mentioned grounds on which they have been discriminated against. 22 As a result, courts have had to define 'discrimination' and also come up with a list of the grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against. In
Hackl v. Financial Intelligence Unit, 23 the petitioner argued that one of the sections of the anti-money laundering legislation was contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional because it granted 'unfettered discretion to the Attorney-General not to take any action against any person in respect of an act that occurred outside of Seychelles'. 24 In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court referred to Article 27 of the Constitution and held that
In order to claim to be the victim of discrimination under article 27 it is imperative that you provide a ground, or 'any ground' upon which you have suffered discrimination and therefore not offered equal protection of the law as available to other people. Discrimination denotes being treated differently, and often to one's detriment, from others on the basis of a certain ground. The provisions set out above do not define or set out the grounds upon which discrimination is not permitted. It bars discrimination on any ground whatsoever without cataloguing a list of such grounds. If one alleges infringement of that provision it is necessary to assert, at the same time, the ground upon which one has suffered discrimination. Is it sex, sexual orientation, gender, race, colour, religion, age, height, or some other ground? It appears to me that the ground upon which someone has suffered discrimination must be articulated. The petitioner has not shown on its petition and supporting affidavit how he has been treated differently and to his detriment, by theAttorney General from persons who are in his situation or other citizens of Seychelles or those with dual nationality and thus denied equal protection of the law. Neither has he alleged a ground upon which he has been treated differently. Was it based on sex, colour, religion, nationality, or age? There must be a ground upon which the discrimination is alleged to have been based. The petitioner's claim under this head is entirely without merit. 25
The following should be noted about the Court's reasoning above. Firstly, for an argument that a person has been discriminated against to succeed, the person has to point out the ground on which he has been discriminated against. Because the Constitution does not provide for those grounds, the person has to look for those grounds from somewhere else. It is argued that this ruling could open doors for people to allege any ground of discrimination https://repository.uwc.ac.za/ which is not prohibited in Seychellois law or in any regional or international human rights instrument ratified or acceded to by Seychelles. It is submitted that in the light of the fact that Article 27 does not enumerate the grounds against which a person may not be discriminated against, the prohibited grounds should be found in Seychelles national legislation or in international human rights instruments ratified or acceded to by Seychelles.
There are pieces of legislation 26 and regional 27 and international human rights instruments 28 that have been ratified by Seychelles which provide for grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against. It should be recalled that Article 48 of the Constitution guides courts on the question of the approach to take in interpreting the rights in the Constitution. It is to the effect that This Chapter shall be interpreted in such a way so as not to be inconsistent with any international obligations of Seychelles relating to human rights and freedoms and a court shall, when interpreting the provision of this Chapter, take judicial notice of -(a) the international instruments containing these obligations; (b) the reports and expression of views of bodies administering or enforcing these instruments; (c) the reports, decisions or opinions of international and regional institutions administering or enforcing Conventions on human rights and freedoms; (d) the Constitutions of other democratic States or nations and decisions of the courts of the States or nations in respect of their Constitutions.
Article 48 gives Seychellois a very large pool from which to draw authorities when interpreting the rights in the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Article 48 is only applicable when the interpretation of a constitutional provision is in issue. 29 However, the application of Article 48 is not without its challenges. In Platte Island Villa Resort Ltd v.
EME Management Services Ltd, 30 the Court of Appeal held that
Interestingly, the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles makes special mention of the doctrine of judicial notice in its Article 48 which provides that the rights enshrined in Chapter III shall be interpreted in such a way as not to be consistent with any international obligations of Seychelles relating to human rights and freedoms and a Court shall, when interpreting the provision of this Chapter, take judicial notice of the Constitutions of other emocratic States or nations in respect of their Constitutions ... The only difficulty with the application of this provision is how should the courts take judicial notice in any particular case that such and such a country is a democratic state. 31
The Court of Appeal held that Seychellois courts refer to the decisions of courts from other countries 'not for the purposes of precedents but for the sake of taking judicial notice thereof'. 32 Relying on Article 48, 33 Seychellois Courts have referred to regional and international human rights in interpreting the rights in the Constitution including the right to freedom from discrimination. 34 For example, in Gill v. Registrar of Political Parties, 35 the Court held that the Registrar of Political Parties had made the correct decision in https://repository.uwc.ac.za/ refusing to register a political party whose main objective was to propagate racial discrimination in Seychelles. In substantiating its judgment, the Court reasoned that
The purpose or object of [the political party in question] is not only unlawful and inconsistent with the Constitution and other laws of Seychelles but also it is repugnant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out therein, without distinction of any kind, in particular as to race, colour or national origin. All human beings are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law against any discrimination and against any incitement to discrimination. Any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and there is no justification for racial discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere; the discrimination between human beings on the grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin is an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among nations and is capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples and the harmony of persons living side by side even within one and the same State; the existence of racial barriers is repugnant to the ideals of any human society and civilization. 36
In this case, the Court limits the grounds on which the person may not be discriminated against to those enumerated in international human rights instruments. In Brioche & Ors v.
Attorney-General & Anor, 37 the Supreme Court referred to Article 27 of the Constitution and held that Equal protection is often invoked in respect of a person or groups of people who are denied certain rights and freedoms in preference to other persons on some clear ground as the basis for different treatment. The ordinary grounds of discrimination being race, gender, sex, religion, colour, age, disability, or any other ground. Contravention of art 27 would have to be linked not only to a denial of a right or freedom under the charter to the petitioners which another similarly situated person or persons are allowed to enjoy on account of a ground such as race, gender, sex, religion, colour, age, political or other opinion or persuasion, language, ethnicity, national or social group or any other recognisable ground. 38
In his separate concurring judgment in In Roger Mancienne v. The Attorney General, 39 Venchard J.A held that The objection raised by [the appellant's lawyer that the relevant piece of legislation was discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional for allowing the executive to grant immunity from prosecution to some foreign investors] is misconceived. It stems from the erroneous belief that Article 27 of the Constitution creates an absolute right of equality. I readily concede that the courts can sanction any discrimination which impinges on the fundamental rights of the citizen enshrined in the Constitution or on grounds of sex, race or religion. The appellant does not however invoke any of these grounds. 40 The above jurisprudence shows different grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against are mentioned in different judgments. It is argued that it would be extending the ambit of Article 27 too far to interpret it as accommodating any ground in the world against which a person may not be discriminated against. Seychelles may not be at that stage where discrimination based on some grounds should be prohibited. For example, the Court's holding that sexual orientation is one of the grounds against which a person may not be discriminated is not supported by Article 32 of the Constitution which prohibits same-sex marriages. 41 The second point to note about the Supreme Court's decision in Hackl v. Financial Intelligence Unit 42 is that the Court attempts to define discrimination as 'being treated differently, and often to one's detriment, from others on the basis of a certain ground'. It is argued that the above definition of discrimination would have been enriched had the Court referred to international human rights instruments in which 'discrimination' has been defined. Apart from a general definition of discrimination, Seychelles is required to enact legislation that defines discrimination against women. While commenting on the combined initial to fifth periodic reports of Seychelles, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women was 'concerned about the absence of a specific definition and prohibition of discrimination against women in all areas of life in the Constitution or in other appropriate legislation, in line with Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention'. 43 In Roger Mancienne v. The Attorney General, 44 the Court of Appeal held that
[i]n terms of Article 27(1), the right to equal protection of the law inheres in every person. The substance of the right is that except as permitted by law which is in accord with the Constitution every person has a right to equal treatment by the law. 45
Alleging discrimination
Although Article 27(1) does not enumerate grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against, some people have gone to court and argued that they have been discriminated against. Cases in which people have alleged discrimination show that they have adopted different approaches. In the first approach, the applicants have not mentioned the grounds on which they have been discriminated against. For example, in Republic v.
Bibi, 46 the applicant's application for bail had been dismissed because of the seriousness of the offence (murder) he had allegedly committed. In declining to release the applicant on bail, the Court held that
In Seychelles the offences of murder and treason were brought under the general category of "serious offence" so that those offenders would not be singled out for discrimination in terms of the right to equal protection of the law. Hence the Court is now able to use its discretion generally. But although the death penalty has been abolished in Seychelles, the possibility of an accused faced with a possibility of a sentence of life imprisonment absconding cannot be underestimated. 47 In this case, the Court is silent on the ground on which the accused could have been discriminated against by a judicial officer for the purpose of bail application. In Talma v.
Michel, 48 the petitioners submitted before the Constitutional Court that the government's refusal to allow them to construct a hotel at one of the islands in Seychelles contravened, among others, their right under Article 27 of the Constitution because 'other owners and developers have been granted permission to construct two restaurants' on the same island. 49 In their submissions, the respondents argued, inter alia, that the petitioners' right to equal protection of the law from discrimination under Article 27 of the Constitution has not been contravened as the petitioners have not been treated any differently from the owners of land at [the island] in similar circumstances. 50
The Court found that there was no evidence to show that the petitioners had 'suffered any discrimination contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution on the facts before this court'. 51 There are at least two observations to make about this case. Firstly, the petitioner did not mention the ground on which he had been discriminated against. Neither the prosecutor nor the Court paid attention to this omission. Secondly, the Court does not motivate why it came to the conclusion that there was no evidence that the respondent's conduct had violated the petitioners' right under Article 27. This was the case although both the petitioner and the respondent made submissions of this issue. One would have expected the Court to explain the basis for its conclusion to the effect that the facts before it did not show that the respondent had violated Article 27. In Brioche & Ors v. Attorney-General & Anor, 52 the Supreme Court held that for a petition in terms of Article 27 of the Constitution to succeed, the petitioner must allege a ground on which he has been discriminated against. 53 The second approach, as will be shown in the jurisprudence below, is for applicants to allege a specific ground on which they have allegedly been discriminated against.
Locus standi to challenge discriminatory laws or programmes Article 46 of the Constitution provides for the procedure to be followed in challenging the constitutionality of any law that violates any right in the Constitution. Article 46 states that:
A person who claims that a provision of this Charter has been or is likely to be contravened in relation to the person by any law, act or omission may, subject to this article, apply to the Constitutional Court for redress.
2.
An application under clause (1) may, where the Constitutional Court is satisfied that the person whose right or freedom has been or is likely to be contravened is unable to do so, be made by another person acting on behalf of that person, with or without that person's authority.
The Constitutional Court held that '[i]t is apparent on a reading of article 46 Firstly, an application alleging a contravention of a right or a risk of contravening a right in the Charter has to be brought by the victim or potential victim or on behalf of the victim or potential victim. This approach should be distinguished from the one adopted in countries such as Uganda where such applications do not have to be brought by the victim or on behalf of the victim. 60 Secondly, where an applicant has established a prima facie case, the burden is on the state to prove that there has not been a violation. This means that all the applicant has to do is to establish a prima facie case and then the state must prove that there has not been a contravention or a risk of contravention. The applicant does not have to prove that there has been a contravention or risk of contravention. 61 To draw a distinction between a vulnerable witness who recants the version at the very beginning of evidence or refuses to speak and a vulnerable witness who recants the version of evidence given in examination-in chief; both in cross-examination and re-examination would amount to discrimination between accused persons facing prosecutions [sic] and would be in violation of article 27 of the Constitution which guarantees to every person "the right to equal protection of the law without discrimination." No trial court could or should in our view substitute its opinion contrary to what a victim has testified, to convict an accused. A person is convicted on the evidence before the court and depending on its credibility and the weight that could be attached to it. 74
The Supreme Court, if it is of the view that a person's right to equal protection of the law has been violated by a piece of legislation, may advise that person to challenge the constitutionality of that legislation before the Constitutional Court. 
[W]e acknowledge the plea and plight of the Appellant to have his change of gender recognised. To that extent we recommend to the Legislature to consider whether in the Seychelles of today there is a justification for the recognition of gender change, at least in conformity with the Charter of Human Rights in our Constitution .. . Article 27(1) provides for equal protection under the law and in particular 27(2) states: ... The Appellant may also consider pursuing the matter in the Constitutional Court along those lines and/or in the alternative in terms of the breach of her inherent right to the respect of her private life and dignity. 76
The Court's reasoning should be understood against the background that in Seychelles, it is only the Constitutional Court and the Court of Appeal with jurisdiction to find that legislation or conduct contravenes the Charter of rights. 77
Permissible discrimination
Article 27(2) of the Constitution provides that clause 1, which prohibits discrimination, does 'not preclude any law, programme or activity which has as its object the amelioration of the conditions of disadvantaged persons or groups'. This is what is referred to as affirmative action in the constitutions of some African countries such as South Sudan, 78 Sudan, 79 Uganda, 80 Kenya, 81 Zimbabwe 82 and Namibia. 83 In simple terms, in Seychelles, there are two circumstances in which discrimination is permissible: if the law or conduct 'is necessary in a democratic society', under Article 27(1); or if the law, programme or activity has the object of ameliorating the conditions of disadvantaged persons of groups, under Article 27(2). The first permissible ground, the one under Article 27(1), that is, where the programme, activity or law 'is necessary in a democratic society' is broader than the second ground (the one under Article 27(2)). For the programme, activity or law to be constitutional under the second test, it has to be shown that it is aimed at achieving the one and only purpose: ameliorating the conditions of disadvantaged persons or groups. It has to be proved that the people or group in question are still disadvantaged and that the measures in question are needed to ameliorate their condition. Under the first ground, all that has to be shown is that the discriminatory law or activity is 'necessary in a democratic society'. In Roger Mancienne v. The Attorney General, 84 in which the applicant challenged the constitutionality of a piece of legislation which granted foreign investors immunity from prosecution for some offences on the ground that it was discriminatory because the same immunity was not granted to local investors, the Court of Appeal referred to Article 27(1) of the Constitution and held that
The true purport of the equal protection provisions of Article 27 of the Constitution and similar provisions in other Constitutions is prone to be lost in rhetorics [sic] and emotive language stemming from the universal abhorrence of inequality based on racial origin.
However, now, equal protection clauses have extended beyond the racial discrimination origins that gave them popularity. A much clearer approach to understanding and applying Article 27 of the Constitution is to understand the true meaning and purport of its provisions as can be gathered from its text interpreted with the aid of the interpretation guidelines contained in the constitution itself. 85 The Court added that Article 27(1) guarantees a general right of equal protection of the law. Its plain meaning is that all persons must have equal access to law's benefits and privileges and be equally subject to its obligations. In practical and meaningful terms, equal access must be read as equal opportunity of access. This, unqualified, means that the state either by executive or legislative act must not put one person at an advantage over the other or another at a disadvantage to which the other is not subject. The exception to the generality of the guarantee of equality which permits differential treatment (discrimination) "as is necessary in a democratic society" is an acknowledgement that absolute equality is unattainable. However, discrimination to be acceptable must be trammelled along certain lines. There are discriminations which by current universally accepted norms can never be judged in a democratic society. Examples of such are those based on race or religion and those which impinge on fundamental rights of personal liberty and freedom. 86
Discriminatory legislation which cannot be justified as 'necessary in a democratic society' will be declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. In Roger Mancienne v. The Attorney General, 87 the Court of Appeal held that
In the context of Article 27 of the Constitution and permissible discrimination and in fashioning a test of acceptable differentiation, the word "necessary" has been used to describe a factor that must be present. The word "necessary" is not used in the absolute as indicating something that cannot be done without, but something useful to the promotion of an end or an objective .. . Whether the context of Article 27 of the Constitution or as a test of constitutionality of a disputed classification the word "necessity" should be understood in the mitigated, rather than in the absolute, sense. Michel & Anor, 89 the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of statutory provision 90 which prohibited victims of police action at public gatherings from seeking any redress against the police. In holding that the statutory provision in question was unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court observed that
The only reasonable objective for this provision is that it is designed to enable policemen and women to be able to fulfil their duties without concern about being held responsible for damages caused in the course of fulfilling these duties. However, we cannot see how this is a necessary limitation of liability in a democratic country. The police are able to use their usual police powers, including the use of force, where reasonable and necessary, and the power to arrest. If they exceed these powers, and cause damage to private persons or their property, this should be able to be brought to a courtroom for a judge to decide on whether the individual is entitled to claim compensation. We therefore, find that this blanket immunity is not necessary in a democratic society. 91
The second ground, under Article 27(2), could also be easily collapsed in the first one, under Article 27(1). This is because it is necessary in a democratic society to pass laws or implement programmes aimed at ameliorating the conditions of people who are disadvantaged. The Court of Appeal appears to be of the view that the yardstick to be used in determining whether the law passed in terms of Article 27(1) is discriminatory is not whether the law is 'necessary in a democratic society' but rather whether it is in line with the
Constitution. In Roger Mancienne v. The Attorney General, 95 the Court of Appeal held that
[i]n terms of Article 27(1), the right to equal protection of the law inheres in every person. The substance of the right is that except as permitted by law which is in accord with the Constitution every person has a right to equal treatment by the law. 96
It is submitted that this interpretation narrows that ambit of Article 27(1). This is so because of the fact that not every constitution embodies the principles of a 'democratic society'.
In the combined cases of Azemia v. R and Napoleon v. R, 97 in which the appellants challenged the constitutionality of a Penal Code provision which required courts to impose minimum sentences on those convicted of serious offences on the basis that it discriminated against them and therefore violated Article 27 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court explained the circumstances in which discrimination may be permissible under Article 27. The Court held that Article 27 permits reasonable classification which necessarily causes distinction or discrimination between persons so classified and others. The basis of classification being inequality, mere inequality alone is not forbidden. Dissimilar treatment does not necessarily offend the guarantee of equality in Article 27. What is prohibited is invidious or hostile discrimination which is arbitrary, irrational and not reasonably related to a legitimate objective. There must therefore be a rational basis for the discrimination. 98 The Michel & Anor, 106 the Constitutional Court held that a piece of legislation will be contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution and therefore unconstitutional if it permits 'discrimination with no checks on the Minister's discretion'. 107 The Court also found that legislation which empowers a senior government official to either allow or disallow citizens to organize meetings or processions in public places 'with no intelligible criteria on how any such differentiation would be acceptable' is capable of being invoked discriminatorily and therefore contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution. 108
Conclusion
In this article, the author has demonstrated the measures being taken by the courts in Seychelles to protect the right to freedom from discrimination. This discussion has shown, inter alia, that although Article 27 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination, it does not enumerate the grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against. Courts have come up with different grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against.
However, courts do not refer to any treaty or law as the basis of those suggested grounds. It is recommended that the Constitution may have to be amended to enumerate the grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against. This would be in line with the constitutions of other African countries such as South Africa, Uganda, Mauritius, Kenya and Zimbabwe. Some of the grounds that may be included in the Constitution are mentioned by the courts in the cases discussed above and others have been suggested by other states under the Universal Periodic Review mechanism 109 and international human rights bodies such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 110 Clearly stipulating the grounds upon which a person may not be discriminated against would enable the courts to assess whether or not a given piece of legislation is discriminatory in the light of an enumerated ground(s) and would also enable the petitioners to know exactly which arguments to advance in court. Jurisprudence from some African countries such as Kenya, 111 Zimbabwe, 112
Uganda 113 and South Africa 114 show that those challenging discriminatory laws or policies have clearly stated the constitutional grounds against which they have been discriminated against. The existence of clear grounds upon which a person may not be discriminated against would also enable the legislature to know which conduct or activities to regulate and how to do so. 
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